


Data Transfer Impact Assessment (DTIA) on the transfer to the USA of security events		 This DTIA was made by Privacy Company and SLM Rijk, using and adapting the template provided by David Rosenthal, provided under CC license			
Step 1: Describe the intended transfer					
a)	Data exporter (or the sender in case of a relevant onward transfer):	[University X/ Dutch government organisation Y]			
b)	Country of data exporter:	Netherlands			
c)	Data importer (or the recipient in case of a relevant onward transfer):	Microsoft Corp. USA			
d)	Country of data importer:	USA , Microsoft also has data centers in the EU			
e)	Context and purpose of the transfer:	Metadata about the individual use of Teams, OneDrive, SharePoint and the Azure AD marked as security events and transferred to the USA to Microsoft's central security logs			
f)	Categories of data subjects concerned:	employees/workers and students/pupils with professional Education or Enterprise Microsoft accounts, and external guests with consumer accounts or without accounts invited to join a meeting hosted by [University X/government organisation Y]			
g)	Categories of personal data transferred:	Microsoft explains that it generally only collects pseudonymous and aggregated data about security events. However, there is no limitative description of the categories of personal data Microsoft can transfer to its central security centre in the USA. Security events can be flagged in the service generated server logs that contain directly identifying user names, mail addresses, subject lines of e-mail, file and path names, or in telemetry events that contain pseudonymous data like user and device identifiers and IP addresses.			
h)	Sensitive personal data:	Security events can be used to flag an end-user as potentially abusive, or as a victim of malicious network activity. These data can potentially become special categories of data.			
i)	Technical implementation of the transfer:	Security events are collected by Microsoft's central Network Operations Centre in the USA.			
j)	Technical and organizational measures in place:	As a processor, Microsoft may process personal data, when necessary and proportionate, to secure its services. Microsoft is explicitly authorised in the privacy amendment with the Dutch central government and SURF to further process personal data in security events as an independent data controller to improve the security for all its global customers, in pseudonymised format when possible.			
k)	Relevant onward transfer(s) of personal data (if any):	N/a			
l)	Countries of recipients of relevant onward transfer(s):	N/a			
Step 2: Define the DTIA parameters					
		Rationale			
a)	Starting date of the transfer:	[fill in date]			
b)	Assessment period in years:	2			
c)	Ending date of the assessment based on the above:	X+2			
d)	Target jurisdiction for which the DTIA is made:	USA			
e)	Is importer an Electronic Communications Service Provider as defined in USC § 1881(b)(4):	Yes			
f)	Does importer/processor commit to legally resist every request for access :	Yes			
g)	Relevant local laws taken into consideration:	Section 702 FISA, other FISA warrants such as business records, pen registers and trap and trace devices, EOP 12333 (mitigated by PPD-28), National Security Letters (secret services) and US Cloud Act, US Stored Communications Act (SCA).NSLs based on ECPA, administrative and judicially issued subpoenas, and search warrants. This DTIA takes the risks of two types of US legislation into account: traditional law enforcement, and court ordered subpoenas and warrants, as well as secret services powers, letters and FISC authorisations. Since Microsoft is an "Electronic Communications Service Provider", EOP 12333 and FISA Section 702 also apply directly to Microsoft, and not only to backbone providers addressed in Step 4b of this DTIA. Microsoft also qualifies as "remote computing services" or "electronic communication services". This means the US Stored Communications Act and US CLOUD Act als apply. This DTIA does "not" assess the risks of requests for personal data ordered by EU law enforcement authorities through MLAT requests. This DTIA also cannot take the risks into account of the recently disclosed CIA bulk surveillance based on EOP 12333, as it is not known what categories of personal data this surveillance involves.			
Step 3: Probability that a foreign authority has a legal claim in the data and wishes to enforce it against the provider					
		Probability per case	Cases per year	Cases remaining	Rationale
a)	Number of cases under the laws listed in Step 2g per year in which an authority in the USA is estimated to attempt to obtain relevant data through legal action during the period under consideration.		0,50		The number of 0.5 case per year is an estimate based on (1) Microsoft's own transparency reporting and assurance it has not yet provided any personal data from EU public sector customers to any government*, (2) historical data available in this sector, and (3) a requirement to calculate based on a number greater than zero. *For clarity, under US law, providers can neither confirm nor deny having received any specific legal demands subject to a secrecy obligation.
b)	Share of such cases in which the request occurs in connection with a case that due to its nature in principle permits the authority to obtain the data also from a provider	100%	0,50		The security events are available for Microsoft employees in the clear. Microsoft promises to legally resist every order, pay compensation to its customers when it is compelled to disclose, and Microsoft is a processor, not a data controller for the personal data.
c)	Probability that in the remaining such cases it will be possible for the company to successfully cause the authority (by legal means or otherwise) to give up its request for the data in plain text	100%	0,00		The security events are available for Microsoft employees in the clear. Microsoft promises to legally resist every order, pay compensation to its customers when it is compelled to disclose, and Microsoft is a processor, not a data controller for the personal data.
d)	Probability that in the remaining cases the requested data will be provided in one way or another (e.g., with consent or through legal or administrative assistance)	50%	0,00		Consent from an EU Enterprise or EDU Customer is unlikely, in the absence of an adequate treaty with the USA. Since Microsoft is a processor, and not a controller for the personal data in these logs, it will take time for the US authorities to force Microsoft to provide the requested data. Because security events do not provide a complete picture of the possibly malicious behaviour of an end user, the chance that the authorities will want to undergo such trouble is limited to only particularly important cases, thus significantly reducing the number of relevant cases.
e)	Probability that in the remaining cases the authority will consider the data it is seeking to be so important that it will look for another way to obtain it	10%	0,00	0,00	It is assumed this question tries to assess the probability that Microsoft is hacked. This cannot be excluded.
Number of cases per year in which the question of lawful access by a foreign authority arises				0,00	
Number of cases in the period under consideration				0,00	
Step 4a: Probability that a foreign authority will successfully enforce the claim through the provider					
Legal Basis considered for the following assessment:		Section 702 FISA, other FISA warrants such as business records, pen registers and trap and trace devices, EOP 12.333 (mitigated by PPD-28), National Security Letters (secret services) and US Cloud Act, US Stored Communications Act (SCA), NSLs based on ECPA, administrative and judicially issued subpoenas, and search warrants.			
Prerequisite for success		Probability per case			Rationale
a)	Probability that the authority is aware of the provider and its subcontractors (prerequisite no. 1)	100%		100%	Microsoft is a well-known communications provider with a substantial amount of Enterprise and Edu Customers in the EU
b)	Probability that an employee of the provider or its subcontractors will gain access to the data in plain text in a support-case ... (prerequisite no. 2)	100%	100,00%		By its nature, Security Data are likely to be accessible by Microsoft engineers. They may incidentally also be available for employees performing support.
	... and is able to search for, find and copy the data requested by the authority (prerequisite no. 3)	100%			By its nature, Security Data are likely to be accessible by Microsoft engineers. They may incidentally also be available for employees performing support.
c)	Probability that despite the technical countermeasures taken, employees of the provider, of its subcontractors or of the parent company technically have access to data in plain text (also) outside a support situation (e.g., using admin privileges) or are able to gain such access, e.g., by covertly installing a backdoor or "hacking" into the system (irrespective of whether they are allowed to do so) ... (prerequisite no. 2)	100%	100,00%		By its nature, Security Data are likely to be accessible by Microsoft engineers. They may incidentally also be available for employees performing support.
	... and are then able to search for, find and copy the data requested by the authority (prerequisite no. 3)	100%			By its nature, Security Data are likely to be accessible by Microsoft engineers. They may incidentally also be available for employees performing support.

d)	Probability that the provider, the subcontractor or its parent company, respectively, is located within the jurisdiction of the authority (prerequisite no. 4)	100%		100%	Microsoft is a US based company		
e)	Probability that despite the technically limited access and the technical and organizational countermeasures in place, the authority is permitted to order the provider, its subcontractor or the parent company, respectively, to obtain access to the data and produce it to the authority in plain text (prerequisite no. 5)	100%		100%	Speculative estimate, Microsoft lacks historical data on such scenarios and cannot provide a fact based rationale. By its nature, Security Data are likely to be accessible by Microsoft engineers. They may incidentally also be available for employees performing support.		
f)	Probability that if data were to be handed over to the foreign authority, this would lead to the criminal liability of employees of the provider or its subcontractors, the prosecution of which would be possible and realistic, and as a consequence, the data does not have to be produced or is not produced (prerequisite no. 6)	80%		20%	As data importer Microsoft Corporation implements strict technical and organisational measures to protect access to the Security Data. These measures are set forth in Microsoft Security Policy and shall comply with the requirements in ISO 27001, ISO 27002, and ISO 27018. Microsoft employs least privilege access mechanisms to control access to Customer Data and Professional Services Data (including any Personal Data therein). Role-based access controls are employed to ensure that access to Customer Data and Professional Services Data required for service operations is for an appropriate purpose and approved with management oversight. For Core Online Services and Professional Services, Microsoft maintains Access Control mechanisms described in the table entitled "Security Measures" in Appendix A of it DPA. For Core Online Services, there is no standing access by Microsoft personnel to Customer Data and any required access is for a limited time. Microsoft would certainly take action if its employees in the USA, or employees of subprocessors, would unduly access the Security Data.		
g)	Probability that the company does not succeed in removing the relevant data in time or otherwise withdrawing it from the provider's access (prerequisite no. 7)	100%		100%	If Microsoft receives a valid order/warrant or subpoena, Microsoft may be subjected to gagging order and not permitted to inform its Customer. Hence Microsoft may not be in a position to issue a timely warning to its customer that it can no longer comply with the data protection guarantees in the SCC.		
Residual risk of successful lawful access by a foreign authority through the provider (given the countermeasures):				20,00%			
Step 4b: Probability of foreign lawful access by mass surveillance contents							
Legal Basis considered for the following assessment:		Section 702 US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Executive Order (EO) 12333					
Probability in the period				Rationale			
a)	Probability that the data at issue is transmitted to the provider or its subcontractors in a manner that permits the telecommunications providers in the country to view it in plain text as part of an upstream monitoring of Internet backbones	0%	0,00%	0,00%	The probability is zero for Security Data transferred to Microsoft in the USA, due to TLS encryption.		
b)	Probability that the data transmitted will include content picked by selectors (i.e., intelligence search terms such as specific recipients or senders of electronic communications)	0%			idem		
c)	Probability that the provider or a subcontractor in the country is technically able to on an ongoing basis search the data in plain text for selectors (i.e. search terms such certain recipients or senders of electronic communications) without the customer's permission as part of a downstream monitoring of online communications	0%	idem				
d)	Probability that the provider or a subcontractor in the country above may be legally required to perform such as search (also) with the company's data	0%	idem				
e)	Probability that the data is regarded as content that is the subject of intelligence searches in the country as per the above laws	25%	It cannot be excluded that Security Data processed by Microsoft relating to an EU gov or university organisation are considered interesting for intelligence searches				
Residual risk of successful lawful access by a foreign intelligence service without any guarantee of legal recourse (in view of the countermeasures):				0,00%			
Step 5: Overall assessment							
Probability that the question of lawful access via the cloud provider will arise at all (1 case in the period = 100%)				0,00%			
Probability of successful lawful access by the foreign authorities concerned in these cases despite the countermeasures				20,00%			
Probability of additional successful lawful access by a foreign intelligence service where there is no guarantee of legal recourse (despite countermeasures)				0,00%			
Overall probability of a successful lawful access to data in plain text via the cloud provider in the observation				0,00%			
Description in words (based on Hillson*):				Very low			
The number of years it takes for a lawful access to occur at least once with a 90 percent probability:				∞			
The number of years it takes for a lawful access to occur at least once with a 50 percent probability:				∞			
... assuming that the probability neither increases nor decreases over time (like tossing a coin)							
* Scale: <5% = "Very low", 5-10% = "Low", 11-25 = "Medium", 26-50% = "High" and >50% = "Very high" (by David Hillson, 2005, see <a href="https://www.pmi.org/learning/library/describing-probability-limitations-natural-language-7556">https://www.pmi.org/learning/library/describing-probability-limitations-natural-language-7556</a> ).							
Step 6: Data subject risks							
a)	Estimated probability of occurrence of successful lawful access risk:	0,00%	Very Low	Rationale			
b)	Estimated impact of risk	2= pseudonymised special categories of data	Medium	If the Security Data reveal that an end user in the EU was breached, or was involved in malicious network activity, this in turn may lead to the processing of special categories of personal data. Microsoft or third parties may then take steps to re-identify the user based on the pseudonymous data in the security events.			
		Low					
Step 7: Define the safeguards in place							
				Rationale			
a)	Would it be feasible, from a practical, technical and economical point of view, for the data exporter to transfer the personal data in question to a location in a whitelisted country instead?	No		Microsoft explains why it can only provide the necessary level of security by processing security events in its central USA Network Operations Centre			
b)	Is the personal data transferred under one of the exemptions pursuant to applicable data protection law (e.g., Art. 49 GDPR in case of the GDPR)?	No		Though security events are by nature incidental, this transfer to the USA is structural			
c)	Is the personal data at issue transmitted to the target jurisdiction in clear text (i.e. there is no appropriate encryption in-transit)?	No	Ensure that data remains encrypted	Traffic to the USA is encrypted with TLS/SSL			
d)	Is the personal data at issue accessible in the target jurisdiction in clear text by the data importer/recipient or a third party (i.e. the data is either not appropriately encrypted or access to the keys to decrypt is possible)?	Yes	Foreign lawful access is at least technically possible	The data are by nature accessible in the clear for the Microsoft engineers that are permitted to work with Security Data. Microsoft employees are required to take the provided training on data handling. Employees can only access these data via highly controlled workspaces. Access to pseudonymous security data is possible without the permission of the manager but generally, Microsoft employees do not have access to keys or lookup lists to attribute pseudonymized data to a specific individual.			

e)	Is the personal data at issue protected by a transfer mechanism approved by the applicable data protection law (e.g., the EU Standard Contractual Clauses in case of the GDPR, approved BCR, or - in the case of an onward transfer - a back-to-back-contract in line with the EU SCC), and can you expect compliance with it, insofar permitted by the target jurisdiction, and judicial enforcement (where applicable)?	Yes	Ensure that the mechanism remains in place and is complied with	SLM Rijk and Microsoft have signed the SCCs which have been in place ever since 2010, and are in the process of updating those to the most recently issued version. Microsoft has updated SCCs in place with all third-party subprocessors in India, China or Serbia mentioned in Microsoft Online Services Subprocessors List.		
Based on the answers given above, the transfer is:		permitted				
Final Step: Conclusion						
In view of the above and the applicable data protection laws, the transfer is:		permitted			Reassess at the latest by: X+2	
					(or if there are any changes in circumstances)	
This Transfer Impact Assessment has been made by:				Place, Date:		
SLM Rijk / PRIVACY COMPANY				Signed:		
				By:	[Government org X, University Y]	